Online research in philosophy

The evolution of behaviorism from its explicit beginning with John B. Watson's declaration in 1913 to the behaviorisms of the present is considered briefly. Contributions of behaviorism to scientific psychology then and now are critically assessed, arriving at the conclusion that regardless of whether or not its opponents and proponents are aware, the essential points of behaviorism have now been absorbed into all of scientific psychology. It will assist the progress of the science of psychology if its focus now shifts away from incessant relivings of outdated argumentation to empirical discovery and theory construction based on those discoveries.

Radical behaviorism is fundamentally different from traditional psychology, so it is not surprising that is has been widely misunderstood. It offers an alternative to the traditional treatments of mind that avoids some of the insoluble problems raised by those views. B. F. Skinner attempted many times to describe this alternative with limited success, partially attributable to the opacity of his prose and the excessiveness of his proposed applications. We offer annotated excerpts from one of his books dedicated to this end in an effort to show how his approach deals with topics usually viewed as "cognitive psychology." While modern radical behaviorism has progressed beyond Skinner's conception in important ways, his writings remain instructive.