The case for intrinsic theory: XIII. The role of the qualitative in a modal account of inner awareness
Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):319-350 (2006)
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| Keywords | Awareness* Consciousness States* Metacognition* Emotions Psychological Theories Theories | |||||||||
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