The case for intrinsic theory XI: A disagreement regarding the kind of feature inner awareness is

Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):187-211 (2004)
Motivating this article, as well as the immediately preceding article in the present series, is Kriegel’s recent “Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness,” which consists of a defense of six theses regarding the content of inner awareness. I address here only the first of these six theses, along the very same lines as Kriegel does, that is, with special reference to Woodruff Smith’s phenomenological conception of inner awareness. The first thesis is as follows: “Inner awareness is . . . an aspect of the content of conscious states, not an aspect of their psychological attitude or mode.” And Kriegel describes Woodruff Smith’s conception as denying inner awareness is an aspect of a conscious mental-occurrence instance’s content. Unlike Woodruff Smith, Kriegel holds every conscious mental-occurrence instance presents itself therein too; it does so “secondarily,” giving itself less attention than it does its primary object . I examine here three arguments that Kriegel discerns and opposes in Woodruff Smith’s discussions in favor of inner awareness’s being a part of the modality of presentation in a conscious experience — which part is held to modify the presentation involved in the experience. In addition, I devote some attention to two positive arguments of Kriegel’s against the thesis that inner awareness is such a feature. However, I do not find Kriegel’s negative or positive arguments contra Woodruff Smith’s account to be compelling
Keywords Awareness  Consciousness  Intrinsic  Metaphysics  Perception
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