The case for intrinsic theory IV: An argument from how conscious mental-occurrence instances seem
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (3):257-276 (1999)
More consistently than Aron Gurwitsch, whose intrinsic account of consciousness4 was the topic of the previous two articles of the present series, David Woodruff Smith maintains that, within any objectivating act that is its object, inner awareness is inextricably interwoven with the outer awareness that is involved in the act. I begin here an examination of arguments Woodruff Smith proffers pro an understanding of inner awareness as intrinsic. However, in the present article, I give attention only to one of his arguments, and my discussion focuses largely on how David M. Rosenthal, who holds instead that inner awareness is accomplished by a separate mental-occurrence instance, has interpreted the empirical evidence that Woodruff Smith cites. Woodruff Smith considers how a conscious4 mental-occurrence instance seems to its owner to be empirical evidence that lends support to intrinsic theory of inner awareness. When one introspects a mental-occurrence instance, one finds a single unified experience, not two of them as Rosenthal proposes. Rosenthal accepts this firsthand evidence as tending to support intrinsic theory, but tries to explain the appearances away, mentioning G.E. Moore's description of consciousness as "transparent."
|Keywords||Consciousness Intrinsic Metaphysics Science Rosenthal, D|
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Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
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