The case for intrinsic theory V: Some arguments from James's varieties
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (1):41-67 (2001)
This and the planned next article of the present series mine the wealth of reports and astute discussions of states of consciousness contained in William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience. Thus, I bring out further arguments in favor of the kind of understanding of consciousness4, or inner awareness, that, as it happens, James explicitly opposed in The Principles of Psychology. The alternative, appendage kind of account that James advanced there for consciousness4 stands in marked contrast to intrinsic theory: by requiring that having inner awareness of any mental-occurrence instance must take the form of a separate mental-occurrence instance directed on the first. Intrinsic theory holds instead that every conscious4 mental-occurrence instance possesses a phenomenological structure that includes reference to that very instance itself
|Keywords||Consciousness Intrinsic Mental Metaphysics James|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Thomas Natsoulas (2004). The Case for Intrinsic Theory XI: A Disagreement Regarding the Kind of Feature Inner Awareness Is. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):187-211.
Thomas Natsoulas (2000). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: Further Considerations in the Light of James's Conception. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):139-166.
Thomas Natsoulas (2001). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: Attempted Inroads From the First Person Perspective. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):219-248.
Thomas Natsoulas (2004). The Case for Intrinsic Theory IX . Further Discussion of an Equivocal Remembrance Account. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):7-32.
Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: I. An Introduction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286.
Thomas Natsoulas (1998). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: III. Intrinsic Inner Awareness and the Problem of Straightforward Objectivation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):1-19.
Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: II. An Examination of a Conception of Consciousness 'Subscript 4' as Intrinsic, Necessary, and Concomitant. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (4):369-390.
Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: Incompatibilities Within the Stream of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (2):119-145.
Thomas Natsoulas (1999). The Case for Intrinsic Theory IV: An Argument From How Conscious Mental-Occurrence Instances Seem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (3):257-276.
Thomas Natsoulas (1993). Consciousness: Varieties of Intrinsic Theory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (2):107-32.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?