The case for intrinsic theory: III. Intrinsic inner awareness and the problem of straightforward objectivation
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):1-19 (1998)
Aron Gurwitsch, phenomenologist and intrinsic theorist of consciousness4, contends that every objectivating mental act necessarily involves inner awareness; whenever an objectivating act occurs, it is an intentional object of unmediated apprehension. Moreover, inner awareness is literally intrinsic to every objectivating mental act, a part of its very own individual structure. Gurwitsch further argues that inner awareness is a merely concomitant part of that structure, taking place at the margin of the particular objectivating act, for the reason that the content of inner awareness is not relevant to the content of the thematic process at the core of the act. However, Gurwitsch assigns an essential function to inner awareness by virtue of its content; namely, it helps to constitute the respective objectivating act as a unitary phenomenon over time. Perhaps, therefore, theoretically relegating inner awareness to the margin of an objectivating act amounts merely to an effort to allow for straightforward objectivation without falling into inconsistency. That is, some objectivating acts seem not to include inner awareness and, presumably, this would be explained by reference to intrinsic inner awareness that is no more than concomitant, as opposed to its being interwoven with outer awareness taking place in the central area of an objectivating act
|Keywords||Awareness Consciousness Intrinsic Metaphysics Objectivation Gurwitsch, A|
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