David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):357-377 (1999)
What should be done theoretically regarding those "<span class='Hi'>virtual</span> objects" that James J. Gibson refers to several times in his last book? Does not Gibson's view that we visually perceive, sometimes, items that are merely "<span class='Hi'>virtual</span>" produce a contradiction within his theory of visual perceiving? How can something unable itself to have effects on what occurs in the visual system justifiably be claimed to be an object of visual perceiving? I address among other issues: whether there is a sense in which a theory that treats of perceiving as direct can allow for the visual perceiving of "<span class='Hi'>virtual</span> objects." Also, with specific reference to seven cases of perceived "<span class='Hi'>virtual</span> objects" according to Gibson, I argue against the notion that something "<span class='Hi'>virtual</span>" is what is visually perceived. In the seven cases, the visually perceived items either are, have been, or will be actual parts of the one and only world that we all inhabit or they have no existence. I conclude with comment pertaining to the question: Should physical presence &emdash; that is, an item's stimulational presence in relation to our visual system &emdash; be necessary for us to be said to perceive that item?
|Keywords||Behavior Object Perception Psychology Science Virtual Object Gibson, J|
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