What is wrong with the appendage theory of consciousness?

Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):137-54 (1993)
The present article distinguishes three kinds of accounts of direct awareness : mental-eye theory, self-intimational theory and appendage theory. These aim to explain the same phenomenon, though each proposes that direct awareness occurs in a fundamentally different way. Also, I address a crucial problem that appendage theory must solve: how does a direct awareness succeed in being awareness specifically of the particular mental-occurrence instance that is its object? Appendage theory is singled out for this attention because psychologists, as they embark on their renewed study of consciousness, are most likely to be attracted by appendage theory for their explanation of direct awareness
Keywords Cognition  Consciousness  Mind  Psychology  Science
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DOI 10.1080/09515089308573084
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.

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Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
Ned Block (1995). How Many Concepts of Consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272.
Daniel C. Dennett (1995). The Path Not Taken. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):252-253.

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