Belief change as change in epistemic entrenchment

Synthese 109 (2):143 - 174 (1996)
In this paper, it is argued that both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation, and an axiomatic characterization of this operation is given. Unlike most belief revision operations, the one developed here can handle both multiple belief revision and iterated belief revision.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413766
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References found in this work BETA
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Adam Grove (1988). Two Modellings for Theory Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.

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Citations of this work BETA
Richard Booth (2001). The Lexicographic Closure as a Revision Process. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 11 (1-2):35-58.

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