David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65 (2011)
Two recent arguments purport to find a new and firmer foundation for evidentialism in the very nature of the concept of belief. Evidentialism is claimed to be a conceptual truth about belief, and pragmatism to be ruled out, conceptually. But can the conclusion of such conceptual arguments be regarded as the denial of pragmatism? The pragmatist traditionally conceived belief through its motivational role. Therefore, when confronted with conceptual evidentialism, the pragmatist should cede the term ‘belief,’ but insist that pragmatism be understood as a claim about another attitude, a motivational duplicate of belief. Thus, the original dispute is simply relocated terminologically.
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References found in this work BETA
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
David Velleman (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman (2005). Doxastic Deliberation. Philosophical Review 114 (4):497 - 534.
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Rinard (2015). No Exception for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
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