Conceptual evidentialism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65 (2011)
Abstract
Two recent arguments purport to find a new and firmer foundation for evidentialism in the very nature of the concept of belief. Evidentialism is claimed to be a conceptual truth about belief, and pragmatism to be ruled out, conceptually. But can the conclusion of such conceptual arguments be regarded as the denial of pragmatism? The pragmatist traditionally conceived belief through its motivational role. Therefore, when confronted with conceptual evidentialism, the pragmatist should cede the term ‘belief,’ but insist that pragmatism be understood as a claim about another attitude, a motivational duplicate of belief. Thus, the original dispute is simply relocated terminologically
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan E. Adler (2005). William James and What Cannot Be Believed. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (1):65-79.

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