Defeasibility and memory knowledge

Mind 91 (July):432-437 (1982)
This paper examines a leading traditional account of memory knowledge. (A “traditional” account of memory knowledge locates whatever positive justification there may be for the belief which constitutes that knowledge in a present memory-impression.) The paper (1) presents a pair of cases designed to show that Carl Ginet’s four-part defeasibility-type definition of memory knowledge that p is either too weak or too strong, and (2) suggests how these cases could be handled by one sort of non-traditional account.
Keywords Justification  Memory  Ginet, C  Defeasibility
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DOI 10.1093/mind/XCI.363.432
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