Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 41 (3):353-390 (1994)
|Abstract||In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gärdenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by Spohn's ordinal conditionalization functions, and can be seen as the Jeffrization of a proposal considered by Rott.|
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