In defense of a nontraditional theory of memory

The Monist 62 (January):136-50 (1985)
Abstract A theory of occurrent factual memory is sketched out. The theory represents an alterative to the traditional theory in John L. Pollock’s Knowledge and Justification, in that it analyzes occurrently remembering that p without employing the notion of ostensible recollection that p. The latter notion, it is argued, can be understood in terms of occurrently believing (or being inclined to believe) that p. In defending his theory against nontraditional alternatives, Pollock employs arguments that conflict with his own principle of implicit reasons. That principle, it is shown, sanctions cross-temporal justification of the sort presupposed by the alternative nontraditional theory. [CORRIGENDUM: Line 6 at the top of page 137 should read: memory, then if S occurrently remembers that p at t, then S, at t, has a justified (occurrent) belief that p such that (a) this belief that p constitutes, at t, S’s In lines 7–9 at the top of page 140, the sentence beginning with “For” and ending with “way” should be deleted, and in line 11 “fact” should be “face”.]
Keywords Epistemology  Justifiability  Memory  Occurrence  Pollock, J
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