On remembering an unreal past

Analysis 26 (March):122-128 (1966)
Against Russell’s skeptical conjecture, that the world and its entire population came into existence five minutes ago, it is argued that any one of the following is logically incompatible with the conjunction of the other two: ostensible memories of certain events, records of such events, and the non-occurrence of these same events. This conclusion is reached through a critical examination of (1) the arguments advanced by Norman Malcolm in trying to show that Russell’s “hypothesis” does not express a logical possibility, and (2) the counterarguments by which James W. Cornman tries to show that it does.
Keywords Epistemology  Memory  Past  Unreality  Cornman, J  Malcolm, N  Skepticism  Russell, B
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DOI 10.1093/analys/26.4.122
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