A limiting frequency approach to probability based on the weak law of large numbers
Philosophy of Science 59 (3):389-407 (1992)
| Abstract | Von Mises defined a "physical" probability as a strict limit of the relative frequency of occurrence of an event in repeated trials. As a result of a number of criticisms of von Mises's approach, the more favored approach became the "propensity" interpretation. It is argued here that this interpretation is not compelling and that the only problem in von Mises's approach is the assumption that the relative frequency converges in a strict sense. This problem is then remedied by deducing the axioms of probability theory from the assumption that the relative frequency converges only in the sense of the weak law of large numbers | |||||||||
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