A Counterexample to Parfit's Rule Consequentialism

Derek Parfit argues that everyone ought to follow the principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best. I present a counterexample: a world in which no one's moral beliefs have any motivating force. I explain how Parfit's metaethical commitments imply that such a world is possible, and why this possibility is a problem for Parfit's project of reconciling Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism. I consider two of Parfit's responses to my counterexample.
Keywords Parfit  rule consequentialism  consequentialism
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PhilPapers Archive Jacob Nebel, A Counterexample to Parfit's Rule Consequentialism
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