Duhem and Cartwright on the truth of laws
Synthese 89 (1):89 - 109 (1991)
| Abstract | Nancy Cartwright has drawn attention to how explanations are actually given in mathematical sciences. She argues that these procedures support an antirealist thesis that fundamental explanatory laws are not true. Moreover, she claims to be be essentially following Duhem's line of thought in developing this thesis. Without wishing to detract from the importance of her observations, it is suggested that they do not necessarily require the antirealist thesis. The antirealist interpretation of Duhem is also disputed. It is argued that Duhemian points, often understood antirealistically, bear a realist construal, and that antirealist interpretations of Duhem typically run into problems of consistency or of reducing his position to absurdity. | |||||||||
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K. M. Darling (2002). The Complete Duhemian Underdetermination Argument: Scientific Language and Practice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):511-533.
André Goddu (1990). The Realism That Duhem Rejected in Copernicus. Synthese 83 (2):301 - 315.
Renat Nugayev (1991). The Fundamental Laws of Physics Can Tell the Truth. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (1):79 – 87.
Alexander Rueger & W. David Sharp (1996). Simple Theories of a Messy World: Truth and Explanatory Power in Nonlinear Dynamics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):93-112.
Anastasios A. Brenner (1990). Holism a Century Ago: The Elaboration of Duhem's Thesis. Synthese 83 (3):325 - 335.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem's Thesis Revisited. Synthese 177 (1):139-149.
David Spurrett (2001). Cartwright on Laws and Composition. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (3):253 – 268.
Karen Merikangas Darling (2003). Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1125-1136.
Karen Merikangas Darling (2003). Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1125-1136.
Mehmet Elgin & Elliott Sober (2002). Cartwright on Explanation and Idealization. Erkenntnis 57 (3):441 - 450.
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