David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theory and Decision 48 (3):205-240 (2000)
This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice for decision-makers with incomplete preferences due to partial ignorance, whose beliefs are representable as sets of acceptable priors. We focus on the limiting case of `Complete Ignorance' which can be viewed as reduced form of the general case of partial ignorance. Rationality is conceptualized in terms of a `Principle of Preference-Basedness', according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference. The main result characterizes axiomatically a new choice-rule called `Simultaneous Expected Utility Maximization'. It can be interpreted as agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the (extremal) `acceptable priors' among which the decision maker has suspended judgment. An essential but non-standard feature of Simultaneous Expected Utility choices is their dependence on the entire choice set. This is justified by the conception of optimality as compromise rather than as superiority in pairwise comparisons
|Keywords||Ignorance Ambiguity Multiple priors Rational choice Incomplete preference Robustness Independence Sure-thing principle Context-dependence Choice consistency|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Richard Bradley (2009). Revising Incomplete Attitudes. Synthese 171 (2):235 - 256.
Klaus Nehring (2009). Coping Rationally with Ambiguity: Robustness Versus Ambiguity-Aversion. Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):303-334.
Diego Lanzi (2010). Embedded Choices. Theory and Decision 68 (3):263-280.
Similar books and articles
Bruno Verbeek (2008). Consequentialism and Rational Choice: Lessons From the Allais Paradox. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116.
Reed Richter (1985). Rationality, Group Choice and Expected Utility. Synthese 63 (2):203 - 232.
Reed Richter (1984). Rationality Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):392 – 403.
Robert E. Lane (1995). What Rational Choice Explains. Critical Review 9 (1-2):107-126.
Edward F. McClennen (1990). Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge University Press.
Ivan Moscati & Paola Tubaro, Random Behavior and the as-If Defense of Rational Choice Theory in Demand Experiments.
Charles F. Manski (2011). Actualist Rationality. Theory and Decision 71 (2):195-210.
Wlodek Rabinowicz (1995). To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility Violations. Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.
Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2013). A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice. Noûs 47 (1):104-134.
Walter Bossert (2001). Choices, Consequences, and Rationality. Synthese 129 (3):343 - 369.
Stanley Kelley (1995). The Promise and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory. Critical Review 9 (1-2):95-106.
Howard Sankey (1995). The Problem of Rational Theory-Choice. Epistemologia 18 (2):299-312.
Isaac Levi (2008). Why Rational Agents Should Not Be Liberal Maximizers. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):1-17.
Added to index2010-09-02
Total downloads8 ( #187,294 of 1,413,324 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #94,221 of 1,413,324 )
How can I increase my downloads?