Self-Predication and Plato's Theory of Forms

American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (2):93 - 103 (1979)
This paper offers an interpretation of self-Predication (the idea that justice is just) in plato, Given that self-Predication is accepted as obvious both by plato and by his audience, Which entails that "all" self-Predications are clearly, Though not trivially, True. More strongly, It is suggested that "only" self-Predications can be accepted as clearly true by plato. This is to deny that plato had at his disposal an articulated notion of predication, And his middle theory of forms, Primarily the relation of participation, Is seen as his attempt to arrive at that notion. It is argued that his metaphysical and semantical views are heavily influenced by eleatic monism. But this monism is incompatible with the very idea of predication. It is only in his later works, Where he attacks parmenides directly, That plato manages to lay the groundwork for what can be considered as the discovery of predication
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/20009746
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,890
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Zhi-Hue Wang (2008). Plato's Third Man Argument. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 2:197-203.
Paul Woodruff (1993). Plato on Self-Predication of Forms. Review of Metaphysics 47 (1):158-160.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

38 ( #85,986 of 1,725,304 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #167,146 of 1,725,304 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.