The product of self-deception

Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437 (2007)
I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action in a way that exemplifies the motivational role of belief. Furthermore, by applying independent criteria of what it is for a mental state to be a belief, I defend the more intuitive view that being self-deceived that p entails believing that p. Beliefs (i) are the default for action relative to other cognitive attitudes (such as imagining and hypothesis) and (ii) have cognitive governance over the other cognitive attitudes. I explicate these two relations and argue that they obtain for the product of self-deception.
Keywords Self-deception  Belief  Avowal  Avowed belief  Paradox
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-007-9058-x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Neil Van Leeuwen, The product of self-deception
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John Perry (2009). Reference and Reflexivity. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Eric Funkhouser (2005). Do the Self-Deceived Get What They Want? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Neil Van Leeuwen (2008). Finite Rational Self-Deceivers. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):191 - 208.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

159 ( #10,358 of 1,725,471 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

40 ( #28,981 of 1,725,471 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.