Graduate studies at Western
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):243–259 (2007)
|Abstract||I believe that the data is both fascinating and instructive, but in this paper I will resist the conclusion that we must give up Invariantism, or, as I prefer to call it, Uniﬁcationism. In the process of examining the challenging data and responding to it, I will try to draw some larger lessons about how to use the kind of data being collected. First, I will provide a brief description of some inﬂuential theories of responsibility, and then explain the threat to them from the experimental results. Finally, I will set out my general approach to the data, as well as some speciﬁc suggestions about how to think about each set of experiments. I will conclude that philosophers searching for a uniﬁed theory need not give up, but that at the same time they can learn a great deal from the new data.|
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