Eliminative materialism and substantive commitments

Abstract
This paper is an attempt to bring some order to a classic debate over the mind/body problem. I formulate the dualist, identity, and eliminativist positions and then examine the disagreement between eliminativists and their critics. I show how the apparent impasse between eliminativists and non-eliminativists can be helpfully interpreted in the light of the higher-order debate over methodological versus substantive commitments in philosophy. I argue that non-eliminativist positions can be defended using Roderick Chisholm's defense of what he calls "particularism" in the problem of the criterion.
Keywords Eliminativism  Materialism  Metaphysics  Mind  Problem of the Criterion  R.M. Chisholm
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