David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):181–206 (2005)
In conclusion, then, the situationist literature provides a rich area of exploration for those interested in freedom and responsibility. Interestingly, it does not do so primarily because it is situationist in the sense of supporting the substantive thesis about the role of character traits. Rather it is because it makes us wonder whether we really do act on a regular basis with the particular normative, epistemic,and reactive capacities that are central to our identity as free and responsible agents.
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References found in this work BETA
John M. Doris (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge University Press.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Gilbert Harman (1999). Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999):315-331.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jason D'Cruz (2015). Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):467-484.
Markus E. Schlosser (2013). Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
Joshua Shepherd (2015). Scientific Challenges to Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 10 (3):197-207.
Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
David O. Brink (2013). Situationism, Responsibility, and Fair Opportunity. Social Philosophy and Policy (1-2):121-149.
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