Is it Always Fallacious to Derive Values From Facts?

Argumentation 9 (4):553-562 (1995)
Charles Pigden has argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden’s argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic, and does not rely on controversial assumptions about Aristotelian biology or 'institutional facts.'
Keywords Is-Ought Gap  Pigden  logical validity  Hume  conservativeness of log  meta-ethics
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DOI 10.1007/BF00737777
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References found in this work BETA
Charles Pigden (1991). Naturalism. In Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell 421-431.
Charles R. Pigden (1989). Logic and the Autonomy of Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):127 – 151.
Charles Pigden (1988). Anscombe on `Ought'. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):20-41.

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