More Bad News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):203-216 (2007)
Are there good arguments from Is to Ought? Toomas Karmo has claimed that there are trivially valid arguments from Is to Ought, but no sound ones. I call into question some key elements of Karmo’s argument for the “logical autonomy of ethics”, and show that attempts to use it as part of an overall case for moral skepticism would be self-defeating.
Keywords Is/Ought Gap  Metaethics  Logic  Karmo, Toomas  Moral Skepticism  validity  moral epistemology
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.2007.0018
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