Moral realism and program explanation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):417 – 428 (2006)
Abstract
Alexander Miller has recently considered an ingenious extension of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit's account of 'program explanation' as a way of defending non-reductive naturalist versions of moral realism against Harman's explanatory criticism. Despite the ingenuity of this extension, Miller concludes that program explanation cannot help such moral realists in their attempt to defend moral properties. Specifically, he argues that such moral program explanations are dispensable from an epistemically unlimited point of view. I show that Miller's argument for this negative claim is inadequate, and that he has, in spite of himself, identified a promising defence of moral realism.
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References found in this work BETA
Ronald Dworkin (1996). Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):87–139.
Alexander Miller (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Distributed in the Usa by Blackwell Publishers.
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