David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2011)
Nelkin presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately reaffirming our conception of ourselves as agents. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility begins with a defense of the rational abilities view, according to which one is responsible for an action if and only if one acts with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. The view is compatibilist -- that is, on the view defended, responsibility is compatible with determinism -- and one of its striking features is a certain asymmetry: it requires the ability to do otherwise for responsibility when actions are praiseworthy, but not when they are blameworthy. In defending and elaborating the view, Nelkin questions long-held assumptions such as those concerning the relation between fairness and blame and the nature of so-called reactive attitudes such as resentment and forgiveness. Her argument not only fits with a metaphysical picture of causation -- agent-causation -- often assumed to be available only to incompatibilist accounts, but receives positive support from the intuitively appealing Ought Implies Can Principle, and establishes a new interpretation of freedom and moral responsibility that dovetails with a compelling account of our inescapable commitments as rational agents.
|Keywords||Free will and determinism Responsibility|
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|Call number||BJ1461.N455 2011|
|ISBN(s)||9780199608560 0199608563 9780199684762|
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References found in this work BETA
Matthew Talbert (2008). Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):516-535.
Citations of this work BETA
Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess (2016). Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1):n/a-n/a.
Markus E. Schlosser (2013). Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
Chandra Sripada (2016). Self-Expression: A Deep Self Theory of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1203-1232.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2015). Everyone Thinks That an Ability to Do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.
Robert Lockie (2014). Three Recent Frankfurt Cases. Philosophia 42 (4):1005-1032.
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