David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Faith and Philosophy 8 (3):368-379 (1991)
Philosophical naturalism is a cluster of views and impulses typically taken to include atheism, physicalism, radical empiricism or naturalized epistemology, and some sort of relativism, subjectivism or nihilism about morality. I argue that a problem arises when the naturalist offers the argument from evil for atheism. Since the argument from evil is a moral argument, it cannot be effectively deployed by anyone who holds the denatured ethical theories that the naturalist typically holds. In the context of these naturalistic ethical theories, the argument from evil typically fails to provide good reason for either the naturalist or the theist to disbelieve in the God of theism. This does not prove that naturalism is false, or that the argument from evil is unsound, but rather that certain naturalists’ use of the argument has been misguided
|Keywords||argument from evil atheism naturalism metaethics relativism subjectivism nihilism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert Lehe (2009). The Nihilistic Consequences of the Argument From Evil. International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):427-437.
Daniel Howard-Snyder (2008). Theodicy. In Kelly Clark (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Religion. Broadview.
Daniel Howard-Snyder (2005). On Rowe's Argument From Particular Horrors. In Kelly Clark (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Religion. Broadview.
Daniel Howard-Snyder (1999). God, Evil, and Suffering. In Michael Murray (ed.), Reason for the Hope Within. Eerdmans. 217--237.
Del Kiernan-Lewis (2007). Naturalism and the Problem of Evil. Philo 10 (2):125-135.
Daniel Howard-Snyder & John Hawthorne (1994). On the a Priori Rejection of Evidential Arguments From Evil. Sophia:33-47.
James A. Keller (1989). The Problem of Evil and the Attributes of God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 26 (3):155 - 171.
Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.) (1996). The Evidential Argument From Evil. Indiana University Press.
Richard Otte (2000). Evidential Arguments From Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (1):1-10.
Nicholas Everitt (2000). Why Only Perfection Is Good Enough. Philosophical Papers 29 (3):155-158.
Daniel Howard-Snyder (1990). Surplus Evil. Philosophical Quarterly 40:78-86.
Daniel Howard-Snyder & Michael Bergmann (2003). Grounds for Belief in God Aside, Does Evil Make Atheism More Reasonable Than Theism? In Michael Peterson & Raymond Van Arrogan (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell. 140--55.
Krzysztof Hubaczek (2007). William Rowe's Bayesian Argument From Evil Against the Existence of God: An Attempt at Analysis and Assessment (in Polish). Diametros 14:32 - 52.
Michael Almeida (2004). The New Evidential Argument Defeated. Philo 7 (1):22-35.
Added to index2011-02-21
Total downloads14 ( #109,791 of 1,096,620 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #71,259 of 1,096,620 )
How can I increase my downloads?