David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Psyche 7 (13) (2001)
Siewert identifies a special kind of conscious experience, phenomenal consciousness, that is the sort of consciousness missing in a variety of cases of blindsight. He then argues that phenomenal consciousness has been neglected by students of consciousness when it should not be. According to Siewert, the neglect is based at least in part on two false assumptions: phenomenal features are not intentional and phenomenal character is restricted to sensory experience. By identifying an essential tension in Siewert's characterization of phenomenal consciousness, I argue that his case for denying and is at best incomplete
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1).
Nicholas Georgalis (2003). The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
Mark Pharoah, 'Thing-in-Itself' - Exploring the Relationship Between Phenomenal Experience and the Phenomenon of Consciousness.
Uriah Kriegel (2006). Theories of Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.
Uriah Kriegel (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
Mark Rowlands (2003). Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
Richard Menary (2009). Intentionality and Consciousness. In William Banks (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads121 ( #10,539 of 1,681,636 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #33,958 of 1,681,636 )
How can I increase my downloads?