Unconscious sensations

Philosophical Psychology 2 (March):129-41 (1989)
Abstract
Abstract Having, in previous papers, distinguished at least three forms of consciousness (a first?order, information?processing state?called here ?C1'; a second?order, direct, non?inferential accessing of other conscious states?called here ?C2'; and a phenomenological state?called here ?CN'), I now further examine their differences. This examination has some surprising results. Having argued that neither C1 nor C2 is a phenomenological state?and so different from CN?I now show that CN itself is best thought of as a subclass of a larger state ('CS'?sensation consciousness). CS is the set of image?representation states. CN is that set of CS states that we are also C2 about. I argue that CN states should be considered a subset of CS states because they share with other CS states imagistic representational powers as opposed to the sentential ones of C1 and C2. And I argue that there are good reasons to consider any state which utilises imagistic representation as a sensation. I then show that the notion of an unconscious sensation makes sense if we think of it as a CS state that is not C2. More radically, I conclude that either it makes sense to say that there are unfelt sensations or there are felt sensations (phenomenological states) we are not conscious about. While there are good reasons for saying one or the other of these surprising things, I argue that the second, more radical sounding, alternative is actually better motivated?and not quite so surprising as it sounds
Keywords Introspection  Metaphysics  Perception  Philosophical Psychology  Sensation  Unconscious
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    References found in this work BETA
    Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Norton Nelkin (1990). Categorizing the Senses. Mind and Language 5 (2):149-165.
    Dan Lloyd (1991). Consciousness: Only Introspective Hindsight? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):686-687.
    Raymond S. Corteen (1991). Consciousness and Making Choices. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):674.

    View all 21 citations

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