David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind 119 (473):83-102 (2010)
In ethics, it is commonly supposed that we have both positive duties and negative duties, things we ought to do and things we ought not to do. Given the many parallels between ethics and epistemology, we might suppose that the same is true in epistemology, and that we have both positive epistemic duties and negative epistemic duties. I argue that this is false; that is, that we have negative epistemic duties, but no positive ones. There are things that we ought not to believe, but there is nothing that we ought to believe, on purely epistemic grounds. I also consider why the parallels between ethics and epistemology break down at this particular point, suggesting that it is due to what I call the infinite justificational ‘fecundity’ of perceptual and propositional evidence
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Dancy (1982). Intuitionism in Meta-Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 42 (3):395 - 408.
Pascal Engel (2005). Logical Reasons. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):21 – 38.
Mark T. Nelson (2002). What Justification Could Not Be. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):265 – 281.
Citations of this work BETA
Thomas Kroedel (2012). The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility. Analysis 72 (1):57-60.
Scott Stapleford (2013). Imperfect Epistemic Duties and the Justificational Fecundity of Evidence. Synthese 190 (18):4065-4075.
Daniel Laurier (2013). Les Raisons Épistémiques Sont-Elles Instrumentales? Dialogue 52 (2):211-231.
Similar books and articles
Raymond A. Belliotti (1978). Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and Rights. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):581-588.
Steven Daskal (2013). Confining Pogge's Analysis of Global Poverty to Genuinely Negative Duties. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):369-391.
Judith Lichtenberg (2010). Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the “New Harms”. Ethics 120 (3):557-578.
Anthony Robert Booth (2008). Deontology in Ethics and Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):530-545.
Anthony Robert Booth (2012). All Things Considered Duties to Believe. Synthese 187 (2):509-517.
Pablo Gilabert (2006). Basic Positive Duties of Justice and Narveson's Libertarian Challenge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):193-216.
Chase B. Wrenn (2007). Why There Are No Epistemic Duties. Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (01):115-136.
Corinna Mieth (2008). World Poverty as a Problem of Justice? A Critical Comparison of Three Approaches. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):15 - 36.
Dennis J. Moberg & Michael J. Meyer (1990). A Deontological Analysis of Peer Relations in Organizations. Journal of Business Ethics 9 (11):863 - 877.
Added to index2010-08-11
Total downloads58 ( #29,244 of 1,101,944 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #16,124 of 1,101,944 )
How can I increase my downloads?