What is consciousness?

Philosophy of Science 60 (3):419-34 (1993)
When philosophers and psychologists think about consciousness, they generally focus on one or more of three features: phenomenality , intentionality , and introspectibility . Using examples from empirical psychology and neuroscience, I argue that consciousness is not a unitary state, that, instead, these three features characterize different and dissociable states, which often happen to occur together. Understanding these three features as dissociable from each other will resolve philosophical disputes and facilitate scientific investigation
Keywords Consciousness  Experience  Philosophy  Psychology  Science
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Norton Nelkin (1994). Patterns. Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.
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