Why is 'incommensurability' a problem?

Acta Biotheoretica 31 (4) (1982)
Abstract
The origins of the ‘incommensurability problem’ and its central aspect, the ‘meaning variance thesis’ are traced to the successive collapse of several distinctions maintained by the standard empiricist account of meaning in scientific theories. The crucial distinction is that between a conceptual structure and a theory. The ‘thesis’ and the ‘problem’ follow from critiques of this distinction by Duhem, Quine and Feyerabend. It is maintained that, rather than revealing the ‘problem’, the arguments leading to it simply show the inadequacy of the reductionist theory of meaning. The genuine remaining problem is that of the development of a new theory of meaning in science.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,371
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
David Gooding (1986). How Do Scientists Reach Agreement About Novel Observations? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17 (2):205-230.
Similar books and articles
David Pearce (1984). Research Traditions, Incommensurability and Scientific Progress. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 15 (2):261-271.
Howard Sankey (1998). Taxonomic Incommensurability. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (1):7 – 16.
A. Polikarov (1993). Is There an Incommensurability Between Superseding Theories? On the Validity of the Incommensurability Thesis. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 24 (1):127 - 146.
Howard Sankey (2009). Scientific Realism and the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 40 (2):196-202.
Stathis Psillos (2008). Carnap and Incommensurability. Philosophical Inquiry 30 (1-2):135-156.
S. K. Arun Murthi & Sundar Sarukkai (2009). Multisemiosis and Incommensurability. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):297-311.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

20 ( #86,334 of 1,102,882 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #183,068 of 1,102,882 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.