David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):84-105 (2012)
Many philosophers hold that the phenomenology of thinking (also known as cognitive phenomenology) reduces to the phenomenology of the speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings associated with it. But even if this reductionist claim is correct, there is still a properly cognitive dimension to the phenomenology of at least some thinking. Specifically, conceptual content makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenology of at least some thought episodes, in that it constitutes what I call their thematic unity. Often, when a thought episode has a phenomenal character, the various associated speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings are often organized around a common theme, constituted by the conceptual content of one's thinking
|Keywords||cognitive phenomenology conceptual and nonconceptual content perception and thought conscious thought|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Richard Brown & Pete Mandik (2012). On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology, Or: What is It Like to Think That One Thinks That P? Philosophical Topics 40 (2):1-12.
Peter Carruthers & Bénédicte Veillet (2011). The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology. In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 35.
T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.) (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press, USA.
José Luis Bermúdez (1999). Cognitive Impenetrability, Phenomenology, and Nonconceptual Content. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):367-368.
Philip Goff (2012). Does Mary Know I Experience Plus Rather Than Quus? A New Hard Problem. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):223-235.
Walter Hopp (2010). How to Think About Nonconceptual Content. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10 (1):1-24.
Michael K. Shim (2005). The Duality of Non-Conceptual Content in Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229.
David Pitt (2013). IndeXical Thought. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 49.
Christopher Peacocke (2001). Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615.
Adam Pautz (2013). Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content? In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford. 194-234.
Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
Alessandro Dell’Anna & Marcello Frixione (2010). On the Advantage (If Any) and Disadvantage of the Conceptual/Nonconceptual Distinction for Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 20 (1):29-45.
Jacob Beck (2012). The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought. Mind 121 (483):563-600.
Uriah Kriegel (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 79--102.
Added to index2011-04-01
Total downloads98 ( #15,133 of 1,679,329 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #16,490 of 1,679,329 )
How can I increase my downloads?