Thematic Unity in the Phenomenology of Thinking

Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):84-105 (2012)
Many philosophers hold that the phenomenology of thinking (also known as cognitive phenomenology) reduces to the phenomenology of the speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings associated with it. But even if this reductionist claim is correct, there is still a properly cognitive dimension to the phenomenology of at least some thinking. Specifically, conceptual content makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenology of at least some thought episodes, in that it constitutes what I call their thematic unity. Often, when a thought episode has a phenomenal character, the various associated speech, sensory imagery, emotions or feelings are often organized around a common theme, constituted by the conceptual content of one's thinking
Keywords cognitive phenomenology  conceptual and nonconceptual content  perception and thought  conscious thought
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.711.x
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