Contextualism and a puzzle about seeing

Philosophical Studies 134 (1):53-63 (2007)
Abstract
Contextualist solutions to skeptical puzzles have recently been subjected to various criticisms. In this paper, I will defend contextualism against an objection prominently pressed by Stanley 2000. According to Stanley, contextualism in epistemology advances an empirically implausible hypothesis about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions in natural language. It is empirically implausible because it attributes to knowledge ascriptions a kind of semantic context-sensitivity that is wholly unlike any well- established type of semantic context-sensitivity in natural language
Keywords Contextualism  Perception
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    References found in this work BETA
    Max Black (ed.) (1965). Philosophy in America. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
    Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Casey O'Callaghan (2011). Hearing Properties, Effects or Parts? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):375-405.
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