David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):1–31 (2003)
A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support the claim that we lack evidence for our beliefs about the external world. These considerations do not threaten the truth of our ordinary attributions of evidence, however, for such attributions are context-sensitive in their semantics. It is argued that this solution to the problem of the external world enjoys all of the benefits, and suffers none of the problems, of other solutions to the problem of the external world
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Thomas Nagel (1986). The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969/1991). On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright). Harper Torchbooks.
Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Schellenberg (forthcoming). Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
Susanna Schellenberg (2014). The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
John Turri (2009). The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons. Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
Nicholas Silins (2005). Deception and Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.
Duncan Pritchard (2005). Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
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