Luminosity and the safety of knowledge

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406 (2004)
In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one interpretation it is obviously true but useless to his argument, and on the other interpretation it is false
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00207.x
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Ernest Sosa (1999). How to Defeat Opposition to Moore. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):137-49.
Ram Neta (2002). S Knows That P. Noûs 36 (4):663–681.
Timothy Williamson (1996). Cognitive Homelessness. Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):554-573.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Lackey (2009). Knowledge and Credit. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.

View all 37 citations / Add more citations

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Brian Weatherson (2004). Luminous Margins. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):373 – 383.
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