Luminosity and the safety of knowledge

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406 (2004)
Abstract
In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one interpretation it is obviously true but useless to his argument, and on the other interpretation it is false
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
    B. J. C. Madison (2011). Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
    Jonathan Vogel (2010). Luminosity and Indiscriminability. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):547-572.

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