Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406 (2004)
|Abstract||In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state sufﬁces for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s conﬁdent belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one interpretation it is obviously true but useless to his argument, and on the other interpretation it is false|
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