David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406 (2004)
In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state sufﬁces for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s conﬁdent belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one interpretation it is obviously true but useless to his argument, and on the other interpretation it is false
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Ernest Sosa (1999). How to Defeat Opposition to Moore. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):137-49.
Ram Neta (2002). S Knows That P. Noûs 36 (4):663–681.
Timothy Williamson (1996). Cognitive Homelessness. Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):554-573.
Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Lackey (2007). Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. Synthese 158 (3):345--361.
Andrew Peet (2015). Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of What Is Said. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Jennifer Lackey (2009). Knowledge and Credit. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
John Turri (2012). Is Knowledge Justified True Belief? Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
Similar books and articles
Peter Murphy (2005). Closure Failures for Safety. Philosophia 33 (1-4):331-334.
Kelly Becker (2007). Epistemology Modalized. Routledge.
Brian Weatherson (2004). Luminous Margins. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):373 – 383.
Dani Rabinowitz, The Safety Condition for Knowledge. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Avram Hiller & Ram Neta (2007). Safety and Epistemic Luck. Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.
Christoph Kelp (2009). Knowledge and Safety. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:21-31.
Juan Comesaña (2005). Unsafe Knowledge. Synthese 146 (3):395 - 404.
Patrick Greenough (2012). Discrimination and Self-Knowledge. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads90 ( #45,699 of 1,902,209 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #54,963 of 1,902,209 )
How can I increase my downloads?