David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):381–396 (2007)
(NEG) is widely accepted both by internalist and by externalists. In fact, there have been very few opponents of (NEG). Timothy Williamson (e.g., 2000) rejects (NEG), for reasons that have by now received a great deal of scrutiny.2 John McDowell also rejects (NEG), but his reasons have not received the scrutiny they deserve. This is in large part because those reasons have not been well understood. We believe that McDowell’s challenge to (NEG) is important, worthy of fair assessment, and maybe even correct. In this paper, we explain McDowell’s challenge to (NEG), and also explain how McDowell can address a seemingly fatal objection to his view.
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Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Evidence and Armchair Access. Synthese 179 (3):479 - 500.
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B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
Duncan Pritchard (2007). Anti-Luck Epistemology. Synthese 158 (3):277 - 297.
B. J. C. Madison (2009). On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism. Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
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