David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Topics 37 (1):115-132 (2009)
This quoted passage makes a negative claim – a claim about what we are not doing when we characterize an episode or state as that of knowing – and it also makes a positive claim – a claim about what we are doing when we characterize an episode or state as that of knowing. Although McDowell has not endorsed the negative claim, he has repeatedly and explicitly endorsed the positive claim, i.e., that “in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing… we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.” This is what I will henceforth call “the positive Sellarsian claim”.
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Ram Neta (2011). A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism. Noûs 45 (4):658-695.
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