Propositional justification, evidence, and the cost of error

Philosophical Issues 17 (1):197–216 (2007)
Abstract
My topic in this paper is a particular species of epistemic justification – a species that, following Roderick Firth, I call “propositional justification.”1 Propositional justification is a relation between a person and a proposition. I will say that for S to bear the propositional justification relation to p is for S to be “justified in believing” that p. What is propositional justification? What is it for S to be justified in believing that p? Here’s my answer.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00130.x
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References found in this work BETA
Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.

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Matthew McGrath (2010). Contextualism and Intellectualism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):383-405.

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