Skepticism, contextualism, and semantic self-knowledge

Abstract
Stephen Schiffer has argued that contextualist solutions to skepticism rest on an implausible "error theory" concerning our own semantic intentions. Similar arguments have recently been offered also by Thomas Hofweber and Patrick Rysiew. I attempt to show how contextualists can rebut these arguments. The kind of self-knowledge that contextualists are committed to denying us is not a kind of self-knowledge that we need, nor is it a kind of self-knowledge that we can plausibly be thought to possess
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    References found in this work BETA
    Max Black (1971/1963). Philosophical Analysis. Freeport, N.Y.,Books for Libraries Press.
    Anthony Brueckner (1994). The Structure of the Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):827-835.
    Stewart Cohen (1998). Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):143-159.
    Stewart Cohen (1998). Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):143 - 159.
    Keith DeRose (1992). Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Michael Blome-Tillmann (2013). Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):89-100.
    Finn Spicer (2006). Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):366 - 385.
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