Undermining the case for contrastivism

Social Epistemology 22 (3):289 – 304 (2008)
A number of philosophers have recently defended “contrastivist” theories of knowledge, according to which knowledge is a relation between at least the following three relata: a knower, a proposition, and a contrast set. I examine six arguments that Jonathan Schaffer has given for this thesis, and show that those arguments do not favour contrastivism over a rival view that I call “evidentiary relativism”. I then argue that evidentiary relativism accounts for more data than does contrastivism
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    Martijn Blaauw (2008). Epistemic Value, Achievements, and Questions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):43-57.
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