David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):283 – 308 (2007)
In the recent literature on concepts, two extreme positions concerning animal minds are predominant: the one that animals possess neither concepts nor beliefs, and the one that some animals possess concepts as well as beliefs. A characteristic feature of this controversy is the lack of consensus on the criteria for possessing a concept or having a belief. Addressing this deficit, we propose a new theory of concepts which takes recent case studies of complex animal behavior into account. The main aim of the paper is to present an epistemic theory of concepts and to defend a detailed theory of criteria for having concepts. The distinction between nonconceptual, conceptual, and propositional representations is inherent to this theory. Accordingly, it can be reasonably argued that some animals, e.g., grey parrots and apes, operate on conceptual representations.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Colin Allen (1999). Animal Concepts Revisited: The Use of Self-Monitoring as an Empirical Approach. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (1):537-544.
Colin Allen & Marc D. Hauser (1991). Concept Attribution in Nonhuman Animals: Theoretical and Methodological Problems in Ascribing Complex Mental Processes. Philosophy of Science 58 (2):221-240.
Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith (1985). Does the Autistic Child Have a “Theory of Mind”? Cognition 21 (1):37-46.
Lawrence W. Barsalou (1999). Perceptual Symbol Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen & Gordon M. Burghardt (eds.) (2002). The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen (2010). Knowledge and Abilities: The Need for a New Understanding of Knowing-How. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):113-131.
John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman (2011). A New Framework for Conceptualism. Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.
Jacob Beck (2012). Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought? Philosophy Compass 7 (3):218-229.
Albert Newen & Gottfried Vosgerau (2007). A Representational Account of Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 67 (2):337 - 353.
Fred Keijzer (2012). The Sphex Story: How the Cognitive Sciences Kept Repeating an Old and Questionable Anecdote. Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):502-519.
Similar books and articles
Paul R. Thagard (1990). Concepts and Conceptual Change. Synthese 82 (2):255-74.
Kristina Musholt (2012). Concepts or Metacognition - What is the Issue? Commentary on Stephane Savanah’s “The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness”. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):721-722.
Manuel Bremer (2005). Animal Consciousness as a Test Case of Cognitive Science. In Bewusstsein: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven.
Kirsten Schmidt (2011). Concepts of Animal Welfare in Relation to Positions in Animal Ethics. Acta Biotheoretica 59 (2):153-171.
Rocco J. Gennaro (2009). Animals, Consciousness, and I-Thoughts. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. 184--200.
Hans-Johann Glock (2010). Can Animals Judge? Dialectica 64 (1):11-33.
Diana I. Pérez (2011). Phenomenal Concepts, Color Experience, and Mary's Puzzle. Teorema (3):113-133.
Colin Allen (1998). Animal Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):66-66.
Achim Stephan (1999). Are Animals Capable of Concepts? Erkenntnis 51 (1):583-596.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads85 ( #14,261 of 1,098,358 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #32,999 of 1,098,358 )
How can I increase my downloads?