David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):283 – 308 (2007)
In the recent literature on concepts, two extreme positions concerning animal minds are predominant: the one that animals possess neither concepts nor beliefs, and the one that some animals possess concepts as well as beliefs. A characteristic feature of this controversy is the lack of consensus on the criteria for possessing a concept or having a belief. Addressing this deficit, we propose a new theory of concepts which takes recent case studies of complex animal behavior into account. The main aim of the paper is to present an epistemic theory of concepts and to defend a detailed theory of criteria for having concepts. The distinction between nonconceptual, conceptual, and propositional representations is inherent to this theory. Accordingly, it can be reasonably argued that some animals, e.g., grey parrots and apes, operate on conceptual representations.
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Gilbert Ryle (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Petra Vetter & Albert Newen (2014). Varieties of Cognitive Penetration in Visual Perception. Consciousness and Cognition 27:62-75.
Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen (2008). I Move, Therefore I Am: A New Theoretical Framework to Investigate Agency and Ownership. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):411-424.
Albert Newen, Anna Welpinghus & Georg Juckel (2015). Emotion Recognition as Pattern Recognition: The Relevance of Perception. Mind and Language 30 (2):187-208.
John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman (2011). A New Framework for Conceptualism. Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.
Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen (2010). Knowledge and Abilities: The Need for a New Understanding of Knowing-How. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):113-131.
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