David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 174 (3):413 - 443 (2010)
In this paper I argue that singularist approaches to solving the Pessimistic Induction, such as Structural Realism, are unacceptable, but that when a pluralist account of methodological principles is adopted this anti-realist argument can be dissolved. The proposed view is a contextual methodological pluralism in the tradition of Normative Naturalism, and is justified by appeal to meta-methodological principles that are themselves justified via an externalist epistemology. Not only does this view provide an answer to the Pessimistic Induction, it can also accommodate our strongest intuitions regarding the progress of science.
|Keywords||Structural Realism Pluralism Theory choice Pessimistic Induction Preservativism Epistemic desiderata Methodology|
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References found in this work BETA
Alexander Bird (2007). What is Scientific Progress? Noûs 41 (1):64–89.
Richard Boyd (1984). Scientific Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 21 (1&2):767-791.
Richard Boyd (1980). Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:613-662.
Angelo Cei (2005). Structural Distinctions: Entities, Structures, and Changes in Science. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1385-1396.
Anjan Chakravartty (1998). Semirealism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):391-408.
Citations of this work BETA
Mark Newman (2010). The No-Miracles Argument, Reliabilism, and a Methodological Version of the Generality Problem. Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.
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