David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Thinking and Reasoning 3 (1):49 – 76 (1997)
Four experiments are reported which investigated the types of truth tables that people associate with conditional sentences and the kinds of inferences that they will draw from them. The present studies differed from most previous ones in using different types of content in the conditionals, for example promises and warnings. It was found that the type of content had a strong and consistent effect on both truth tables and inferences. It is suggested that this is because in real life conditionals make probabilistic assertions, and that the strength of the probabilistic link is determined by the situation in which the conditional occurs. The implications of these findings for current theories of reasoning are considered and it is concluded that none of them is entirely satisfactory. It is suggested that more linguistically based theories may prove more successful.
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Citations of this work BETA
Pierre Barrouillet & Caroline Gauffroy (2015). Probability in Reasoning: A Developmental Test on Conditionals. Cognition 137:22-39.
Eugenia Goldvarg & P. N. Johnson‐Laird (2001). Naive Causality: A Mental Model Theory of Causal Meaning and Reasoning. Cognitive Science 25 (4):565-610.
David E. Over & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2003). The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence. Mind and Language 18 (4):340–358.
Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2001). Mental Models and Deduction. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (10):434-442.
Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Helen Neilens, Simon J. Handley & David E. Over (2008). When Can We Say ‘If’? Cognition 108 (1):100-116.
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