David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Barry Castro (ed.), Collected Papers of Barry Castro: 1968 to 2005. Business Ethics Center, Grand Valley State University (2006)
My aim is to make some comments on the ontology of the correspondence theory of truth. First I shall give reasons for rejecting a Platonic view of propositions. This motivates locating propositions in the world. I then present a version of Russell’s theory of truth, which if it locates propositions anywhere locates them in the world. I consider some of the advantages of this theory, not least among being that it does not need facts as entities.
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