Graduate studies at Western
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):273–300 (2004)
|Abstract||Interpreters of Locke’s Essay are divided over whether to attribute to him a Representational Theory of Perception (RTP). Those who object to an RTP interpretation cite (among other things) Locke’s Book IV account of sensitive knowledge, contending that the account is incompatible with RTP. The aim of this paper is to rebut this kind of objection – to defend an RTP reading of the relevant Book IV passages. Speciﬁcally, I address four inﬂuential assumptions (about sensitive knowledge) cited by opponents of an RTP interpretation and argue that in each case the assumption is false.|
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