The chrysippus intuition and contextual theories of truth

Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345 - 352 (2009)
Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth. The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.” In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition is false. I conclude that the philosophical motivation for contextual theories of truth fails.
Keywords Truth  Contextual theory of truth  Chrysippus intuition
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    Tyler Burge (1979). Semantical Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):169-198.
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