David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138 (2010)
The No-Miracles Argument (NMA) is often used to support scientific realism. We can formulate this argument as an inference to the best explanation this accusation of circularity by appealing to reliabilism, an externalist epistemology. In this paper I argue that this retreat fails. Reliabilism suffers from a potentially devastating difficulty known as the Generality Problem and attempts to solve this problem require adopting both epistemic and metaphysical assumptions regarding local scientific theories. Although the externalist can happily adopt the former, if he adopts the latter then the Generality Problem arises again, but now at the level of scientific methodology. Answering this new version of the Generality Problem is impossible for the scientific realist without making the important further assumption that there exists the possibility of a unique rule of Doing this however would make the NMA viciously premise circular
|Keywords||Scientific realism Reliabilism No Miracles Argument Inference to the best explanation Generality problem|
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References found in this work BETA
William Alston (2005). Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
William P. Alston (1995). How to Think About Reliability. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):1-29.
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
Max Black (1958). Self-Supporting Inductive Arguments. Journal of Philosophy 55 (17):718-725.
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Why the Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism Ultimately Fails. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):132-138.
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