Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138 (2010)
|Abstract||The No-Miracles Argument (NMA) is often used to support scientific realism. We can formulate this argument as an inference to the best explanation this accusation of circularity by appealing to reliabilism, an externalist epistemology. In this paper I argue that this retreat fails. Reliabilism suffers from a potentially devastating difficulty known as the Generality Problem and attempts to solve this problem require adopting both epistemic and metaphysical assumptions regarding local scientific theories. Although the externalist can happily adopt the former, if he adopts the latter then the Generality Problem arises again, but now at the level of scientific methodology. Answering this new version of the Generality Problem is impossible for the scientific realist without making the important further assumption that there exists the possibility of a unique rule of Doing this however would make the NMA viciously premise circular|
|Keywords||Scientific realism Reliabilism No Miracles Argument Inference to the best explanation Generality problem|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael A. Bishop (2010). Why the Generality Problem is Everybody's Problem. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.
James Beebe (2004). The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis. Noûs 38 (1):177 - 195.
Klemens Kappel (2006). A Diagnosis and Resolution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):525 - 560.
Jonathan Adler & Michael Levin (2002). Is the Generality Problem Too General? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):87-97.
Michael Levin (2002). Is the Generality Problem Too General? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):87 - 97.
Earl Conee (2013). The Specificity of the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):751-762.
Juan Comesaña (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27 - 47.
Valeriano Iranzo (2008). Reliabilism and the Abductive Defence of Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 39 (1):115 - 120.
Added to index2009-07-29
Total downloads48 ( #26,469 of 722,744 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,744 )
How can I increase my downloads?