David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 160 (1):53-78 (2012)
Some philosophers argue that many contemporary debates in metaphysics are “illegitimate,” “shallow,” or “trivial,” and that “contemporary analytic metaphysics, a professional activity engaged in by some extremely intelligent and morally serious people, fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued” (Ladyman and Ross, Every thing must go: Metaphysics naturalized , 2007 ). Many of these critics are explicit about their sympathies with Rudolf Carnap and his circle, calling themselves ‘neo-positivists’ or ‘neo-Carnapians.’ Yet despite the fact that one of the main conclusions of logical positivism was that metaphysical statements are meaningless, many of these neo-positivists are themselves engaged in metaphysical projects. This paper aims to clarify how we may see a neo-positivist metaphysics as proceeding in good faith, one that starts with serious engagement with the findings of science, particularly fundamental physics, but also has room for traditional, armchair methods
|Keywords||Metametaphysics Metaphysics Neopositivism Indispensability arguments|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
James Ladyman (2007). Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford University Press.
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Tim Maudlin (2007/2009). The Metaphysics Within Physics. Oxford University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Alyssa Ney (2007). Physicalism and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):41 – 60.
Olin M. Robus (2015). Does Science License Metaphysics? Philosophy of Science 82 (5):845-855.
Sergio A. Gallegos (2015). Measurement and Metaphysics in van Fraassen's Scientific Representation. Axiomathes 25 (1):117-131.
Rasmus Jaksland (2016). The Possibility of Naturalized Metaphysics. Dissertation, University of Copenhagen
Similar books and articles
Cian Dorr (2010). Review of James Ladyman and Don Ross, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (6).
Stathis Psillos (2013). Semirealism or Neo-Aristotelianism? Erkenntnis 78 (1):29 - 38.
Alexander Naraniecki (2010). Neo-Positivist or Neo-Kantian? Karl Popper and the Vienna Circle. Philosophy 85 (4):511-530.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2012). In Defence of Aristotelian Metaphysics. In Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press 26-43.
Volker Peckhaus (2008). Logic and Metaphysics: Heinrich Scholz and the Scientific World View. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):78-90.
Jonathan D. Jacobs (2007). Causal Powers: A Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysic. Dissertation, Indiana University
Helen Verran (2005). On Seeing the Generative Possibilities of Dalit Neo-Buddhist Thought. Social Epistemology 19 (1):33 – 48.
Marcus Rossberg & Philip A. Ebert (2007). What is the Purpose of Neo-Logicism? Traveaux de Logique 18:33-61.
Antony Eagle, Can We Read Metaphysics Off Physics? Or, What Presentists Should Say About Special Relativity.
Nick Zangwill (1992). Quietism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):160-176.
Christian Nimtz (2004). Two-Dimensionalism and Natural Kind Terms. Synthese 138 (1):125-48.
Lydia Patton (2010). Review: Makkreel and Luft (Eds.), Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 30 (4):280-282.
Edouard Machery (2006). Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism. Philosophy Compass 1 (4):398–412.
Added to index2012-04-02
Total downloads259 ( #8,823 of 1,796,529 )
Recent downloads (6 months)24 ( #31,260 of 1,796,529 )
How can I increase my downloads?